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THE MEXICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT:
An Idea Whose Time Has Not Yet Come
By Vernon M. Briggs, Jr.
Like a "bolt out of the blue," the idea of a free
trade agreement with Mexico suddenly appeared on
the nation's political agenda. With no advance
discussion or careful forethought of its ramifications,
the presidents of the United States (George Bush)
and Mexico (Carlos Salinas de Gonari) jointly
announced on June 10, 1990 their intention to
commence negotiations between their countries for
such a mutual relationship. The idea was to replicate
the process whereby both the United States and
Canada had ratified a similar accord only a year
before. The ultimate objective, it seems, is to create
a North American free trade area encompassing the
economies of the three nations.
"Laws to protect the worker and the
environment that do exist in
Mexico are seldom enforced with
vigor or regularity... "
Without divening to a prolonged discussion of
the events that led to the Canadian-United States
agreement, it is imperative to state the obvious:
Mexico is not Canada. There is little comparison
between the economic conditions and the institutional
structure that exist between Canada and Mexico.
Among the world's industrial nations, Canada has
one of the strongest labor union movements (close to
40 percent of the labor force are members). Its union
movement is independent and fiercely defensive of
worker rights. In Mexico, less than 10 percent of the
labor force are unionized at best. Moreover, the labor
movement (Le., the Confederaci6n de Trabajadores
de Mexico) is pan of the broad coalition of interest
groups that comprise the political pany that has ruled
Mexico for over 60 years, the Pany of Revolutionary
Institutions (pRI). It is not an independent force nor
an active voice for worker welfare. As Octavio Paz
has poignantly wrinen, the Mexican union movement
is but another example of an institutional structure
where" form everywhere masquerades as substance."
In Canada, the wage rates in comparable
occupations closely approximate those of the United
States whereas in Mexico the respective wage rates
are but a fraction of those in the United States. For
example, in Canada the average hourly earnings in
manufacturing in 1988 were $13.53 while they were
$13.85 an hour in the United States but only $1.99
in Mexico (and only $.98 in its border assembly
plants called "maquiladoras").l In Canada, there is a
broad array of social insurance programs (including
national health insurance) and a commitment to their
continuance; in Mexico, there are only minimal
social protections and they are very limited in
coverage and benefits. The unemployment rate in
Mexico for 1989 was three times the rate of Canada
and four times that of the United States. In Canada
there is an institutional structure of governmental
agencies in place whose mission it is to enforce
worker and environmental protections; in Mexico
few such laws and fewer such agencies exist. Where
they do, the relevant government agencies are
underfunded, poorly staffed, inadequately trained,
and often lack dedication to their missions. Laws to
protect the worker and the environment that do exist
in Mexico are seldom enforced with vigor or
regularity and, when anempts are made to do so,
they are often undermined by the widespread
toleration of the practice of the mordida (Le., the
"bite", or the bribe of the enforcement officials).
Hence, to compare the ground rules that led to the
feasibility of a trade agreement with Canada with
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those of Mexico is to compare something that is
substantial with literally nothing.
Nonetheless, the Bush Administration, following
the joint presidential announcement, sought to place
these negotiations on a "fast track" that would
preclude subsequent amendments by Congress of the
end product. Congress would be presented with only
a "yes" or "no" option. After extensive debate in the
Spring of 1991, Congress ultimately gave its
approval to this procedure but the vote was close and
the critical tenor of the debate should serve as a
warning that the fate of the proposal is far from
assured.
THE BROADER POLICY CONTEXT:
MARKETS VERSUS RULES
The proposal for a free trade agreement with
Mexico is but the latest example of a broader
movement led by the United States toward less
regulated trade worldwide. It has its peculiarities, of
course, because of the vast disparities in the stages of
economic development between the neighboring
nations, but its specific efficacy must also be
evaluated within this wider context as well.
"Free trade" as an abstract slogan is hard to
question. It is analogous to the emotive phrases
"right to life" or "right to work" in its ability to
simplify complexity and to stifle thought. Such
phrases act as "sound bites" to the mind of the
uninformed listener. They often preclude responses
because it takes time to answer in a reasoned manner
to a cliche.
But "free trade" is more than just a passing
political gambit. It is part of a broader and
conscientious strategy currently in vogue in the US
that is designed to discipline the hopes of the
nation's workers and to reduce their expectations for
a better and more secure standard of living in the
future. It is the latest plank to be added to the free
market catechism of free trade, unlimited
immigration, and deregulation of industry.
Collectively, the pursuit of these principles is
designed to reduce the discretionary rule-making and
regulatory role of public and private organizations in
democratic nations by increasingly moving toward a
laissez Jaire environment where invisible market
forces alone determine economic outcomes.
Market forces, however, have traditionally
manifested little concern for worker rights, human
welfare, or environmental protections. These forces
have no sensitivity for the adjustment difficulties
often experienced by individuals, their families, or
their communities to such unfettered decisions.
Indeed, since the early 1970s, the increasing
acceptance of these principles has contributed to a
steady decline in the real income of US workers and
their families.2 Yet their supporters continue to extol
their imagined virtues.
Under the free market paradigm, markets are
assumed to be efficient. Hence, any interference in
their operation is alleged to be a distortion from
perfection - no matter how humane, compassionate,
or wise it might seem to do so. But if one starts from
the opposite assumption: that markets are not
inherently efficient, interventions into an imperfect
world can improve the conditions of life and welfare
of both individuals and nations. For instance, anti-
discrimination laws can provide greater opportunity
for work to be done by the most productive workers;
health and safety laws can assure that workers are
able to have long and productive work lives; and
child labor laws can guarantee that there will be a
future supply of healthy and capable workers.
"...without work standards,
the loss of economic sovereignty
is tantamount to the loss of
political sovereignty. "
Market forces, as they apply to trade between
nations, operate essentially on the basis of cost
comparisons between trading partners. The market
does not care who produces what or under what
circumstances. Hence, without work standards, the
loss of economic sovereignty is tantamount to the
loss of political sovereignty. Those countries that
seek to protect their workers and their natural
environment are placing themselves at an unfair
advantage if they participate in trade without
international regulations. What sense does it make,
for example, to say that US industries must pay at
least minimum wages, or submit to collective
bargaining representation if a majority of the work
force so wish, or refrain from employing children in
dangerous occupations, or provide safe workplaces,
or be prohibited from practicing employment discri-
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mination, or desist from sexual harassment on the
job, or be prohibited from employing forced labor, or
be required to adhere to strict environmental pro-
tection standards if private enterprises can simply
move to Mexico (or anywhere else) and export their
goods and services back to the United States at
competitive advantages through non-adherence to
such principles? To encourage such relocations
would not only serve to undermine decades of policy
and institutional development in the United States,
but it would also represent a contemptuous belief
that the welfare of Mexico and the lives of its
workers (or those of any other nation) are of
insignificant consequence.
It is not that trade among nations is a bad idea
per se. In fact, it is a far superior option to the
fighting that has traditionally occurred over the
centuries between nations who became envious of
what others had but they did not. Rather, it is that
the goal of a nation's trade policy should be like that
of any other public policy: it should be designed to
further the national interest. Thus, the fundamental
rationale for trade between nations should be to raise
real living standards - not to contribute to an
erosion of existing work standards, or a loss of
employment opportunities, or to allow pollution of
any nation's environment, or to provide a vehicle for
employers in advanced nations by which to exploit
workers in less developed countries for competitive
gain. Yet these seem to be the implicit goals of
evolving US trade policy
- especially as it relates to
the proposed free trade agreement with Mexico.
"...it seems to be forgotten that
the United States economy
was not built on the basis of
free trade or anything that
resembled it. "
It is often forgotten these days that there are
reasons why industrialized nations in the past have
imposed man-made rules to govern the work place
and to regulate trade between nations. It is one of the
greatest weaknesses of contemporary free market
economics that it is ahistorical. It should not be
necessary, but it often is, to remind the current
generation of US citizens as to why there are policy
interventions in the marketplacc. Without government
regulation there were .sweatshops
"
long workdays,
unsanitary and unhealthy work places, unsafe
working conditions, widespread employment discri-
mination, child labor, frequent spells of high
unemployment, and a total disregard for the physical
and natural environment.
As for trade, it seems also to be forgotten that
the economy of the United States was not built on
the basis of free trade or anything that resembled it.
Indeed, its rise to world economic dominance was
based prccisely on the fact that it did not depend
upon the control of foreign markets but, rather, on
the production for its vast home market. The pace of
US economic development was also greatly
stimulated in the 20th century by the expanded
production demand associated with two world wars
that were fought on foreign shores. Immigration was
sharply curtailed from the mid-1920s to the late
1960s. The US labor market over this time-interval
generated high wage and high income jobs that
became the envy of the world. In the process, the US
economy developed a mass domestic market -
especially for expensive and advanced goods and
services that were produced by its highly
heterogeneous industrial structure. As other industrial
nations gradually regained and expanded their
productive capabilities after World War II, they have
been able to reclaim production for much of their
own domestic markets. Moreover, because the US
has been in the process of opening its marketplace
for foreign competition entry since the early 1970s,
some of these nations have been able to select and to
pick-off certain sectors of the US economy for
competition with their specifically tailored export
policies. Even some less economically developed
nations have been able to join the feast.
Unconstrained at home by environmental and worker
protection laws comparable to those in the United
States, they can choose particular segments of the US
economy that are susceptible to competition from
their less costly production requirements. Or,
alternatively, these nations can successfully attract
formerly US-based enterprises to locate in their
countries and then export back to the US the output
that once was domestically produced at higher costs.
Already a trend, this process would be vastly
accelerated as an outcome of a free trade agreement
between the United States and Mexico unless strong
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laoor standards and environmental protections are
included in any final agreement.
It is a sorrowful litany of economic woes that
have befallen the US economy since it adopted its
free trade stance. The United States, which for most
of the 20th century had been a net creditor nation,
has within the past decade become not only a net
debtor, but the world's largest debtor. The value of
the dollar has declined sharply and the depreciation
of the currency has made the value of US businesses
and land very attractive to foreign investors. As
Japan's Vice Minister of Finance and International
Affairs, Makato Utsumi, has said, the falling value of
the dollar is "not putting American products on sale,
but putting America on sale."3 Indeed, the sale of
domestic assets has been so extensive that the specter
of the United States becoming the world's first
internationally-owned nation is no longer a mere
speculative possibility. It is becoming the most likely
scenario should the indifference to the nation's long-
term welfare be perpetuated much longer. In the
process, the ideal of the "American dream" is being
shattered as the people of the nation - collectively
and individually - are increasingly unable to shape
their own destinies. Foreign owners, motivated only
by shott-run profit goals, can hardly be expected to
be as concerned with the long-term welfare of the
citizens or the environment of the United States.
"The proposed...trade agreement needs
to be subjected to lengthy debate
in both countries followed by
a period of prolonged implementation
of comprehensive social reform
in Mexico..."
In this same vein, the struggle by social
reformers over the decades to develop a strong and
viable labor movement as well as to enact a broad
array of worker-protective policies and environmental
safeguards is seriously endangered. None of these
developments can be interpreted as representing
positive trends; yet all can be linked directly to the
"free trade" era that began in the 1930s; spread
slowly in the post-World War II years; accelerated in
the 1970s and 1980s; and is now in high gear in the
early 1990s.
THE PRE-CONDITIONS FOR A VIABLE
MEXICO-U.S. TRADE AGREEMENT
Before moving to the stage of including Mexico
in a regional trade pact with the US and Canada,
certain pre-conditions are necessary. These conditions
are no different than those that other industrial
nations, seeking to establish regional trading blocs,
would agree to to govern their negotiations. In
Europe, for instance, a central component of the
move toward a regional European Economic
Community has been a series of prior agreements on
workplace standards, worker benefits, and common
regulatory regimes.4 The European negotiations have
also involved proposals for massive governmental
transfers of direct aid from the richer nations (e.g.
Germany) to the poorer members (e.g. Portugal) to
assure that when free trade between them starts it
will benefit all the members. No such aid package
for Mexico has even been mentioned in the Bush
proposal.
The negotiations between Mexico and the
United States over the feasibility of such an
agreement should be predicated on the following
broad principles:
. First, comprehensive labor safeguards and
environmental protections must be included as
integral features of any final accord and they
must be spelled out in clear language that can
be easily understood.
. Second, the basis for setting such standards
should be with fairness to both Mexico and the
United States (and Canada).
. Third, all patties that are going to be affected in
the respective nations should be involved in
setting the standards (I.e., the program should
not only involve meeting the interests of
businessmen but also those of workers,
consumers, and environmentalists).
. Fourth, mechanisms for enforcement of
standards must be in place prior to the actual
implementation of such an agreement, and ways
10verify compliance on an on-going basis must
be included in the written terms.
. Fifth, equity concerns must be an essential part
of any agreement to protect the weak in each
nation from any predatory actions by powerful
economic interests.
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Sixth, the goal should always be to write
standards that assure that societal living
standards will be raised as a consequence of
enhanced trade and not lowered in the future.
Realistically, it is likely that it will take a
considerable number of years for the aforestated
conditions to be met and to be agreed upon by both
nations. But this is as it should be. After all, the
process of economic integration in Europe, which is
scheduled to take effect in 1992, began with the
Treaty of Rome in ]958! Protracted debate and
detailed studies were a prelude to each step along the
way. It is unlikely that discussions with Mexico
should take 34 years to complete but it is unlikely
that anything agreed upon within the next decade or
so could possibly be in the best interests of both
nations.
The proposed Mexico-United States trade
agreement needs to be subjected to lengthy debate in
both countries followed by a period of prolonged
implementation of comprehensive social reform in
Mexico before any deal is consummated. In the
meantime, the United States itself needs to enact a
series of reforms. Among these are a firm
commitment to full employment (with programmatic
obligations); adoption of an enforceable immigration
policy that is keyed to meeting demonstrated labor
market needs and not to mollifying special interest
groups; and establishment of a comprehensive human
resource development program to assist individuals
.
and communities to adjust to the adverse conse-
quences of any trade policies. Both nations, and
Canada too, would be wise to adopt a social agenda
similar to that which is now part of the new trade
relationship among the members of the EEC, which
offers a much more enlightened alternative involving
adherence to international rules, rather than to the
free market path currently being advocated by the
Bush administration.
CONCLUDING OBSERVATION
It is ironic that as communism seems to be
collapsing around the world, economic policy in the
United States seems designed to do its best to revive
Marxism from its deathbed. After all, Das Kapital
was a critical analysis of what reliance on purely
free-market principles can produce. At the time of its
publication in 1867, it correctly portrayed the
exploitive proclivities inherent in unregulated fTee
market systems. But Marx did not foresee, in the
capitalist nations, the rise of a viable labor union
movement, nor the adoption of worker protection
laws and full-employment policies by governments,
nor the creation of regulatory bodies to check
otherwise unbridled private sector economic power.
We can hope that history will not be ignored - that
we do not revalidate the Marxian predictions of what
the future may bring by recreating the economic
climate that he described. 8
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